Bau Bang Bust!
submitted by: Alva Leon Matheson
The TACP was assigned the callsign “Sidewinder” and was scheduled to deploy to Vietnam in September. My callsign would be Sidewinder 35. After some “grunt” training, which refreshed my memory as to why I didn’t join the Army, I found myself on a complimentary cruise courtesy of my Uncle Sam and the US Navy aboard the “luxury” troopship the USS General W. A. Mann. We were landed at Vung Tau and then helicopter airlifted to Bien Hoa for more training geared to the way in which we expected to be greeted by the enemy in Vietnam. I think that I should add here for the uninformed, that the term “grunt” is not a derogatory term. My experience with The Big Red One and my research into my father’s WWI service as an infantry rifleman in the trenches with the 38th Infantry Regiment, Third Division, have only heightened my admiration for the “grunt.” He is that bayonet charging, grenade-tossing, mud-crawling, soldier who has been called “doughboy” and “dogface,” and many other more or less printable names. He is as good as it gets.
October found my ROMAD and enlisted partner, Airman Second Class Kieth L. Fabian, and me in our FAC jeep convoying with the 3rd Brigade to our Base Camp at Lai Khe near Ben Cat, about 25 miles north of Saigon. My ROMAD and I were assigned as the two-man TACP with the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment (2/2) of the 3rd Brigade.
Shortly after leaving Saigon, the convoy hit a mine or received a mortar round that hit a civilian bus injuring a South Vietnamese soldier and several civilians. There was also some sporadic sniper fire in our general direction. It was a “puckered trip” the rest of the way to Lai Khe.
November was a month the likes of which I will not forget as long as the Good Lord permits me my memory.
A task force consisting of two of the Battalion’s companies and augmented by a few cavalry APCs and a few field artillery 105 mm Howitzers were to conduct a three-day, two-night road clearing and securing operation. The operation would extend north from our Base Camp at Lai Khe along Highway 13 for five or six miles through the village of Ap Bau Bang. This was to be the Battalion’s contribution toward making Highway 13 safe for a unit of the Fifth ARVN Division moving north through our area on 12 November. The tasks were clearing the highway of likely ambush sites, removing or destroying mines, and sweeping and clearing the area a few hundred yards along each side of the highway. The Battalion CP, with the Battalion CO and the OPSO, chose to move with Company A. Company B would be the advance Company, operating to the north and ahead of the Battalion CP. My ROMAD and I with our FAC jeep would move with the Command Element. The Battalion CO had already made it very clear that he wanted “his FAC” by his side.
Author’s Note: My recollection has Company A as the advance Company and Company C containing the Battalion CP element. However the Bau Bang story by Charles G. Matthews, page six of the Fall 2001 issue of the Division’s newspaper: “Bridgehead Sentinel,” identifies the assignments as stated above.
10 November would be our first day out. Morning came. In his usual thorough manner, which reflected both his dedication and his adventurous spirit, Keith had everything prepared early and in order. The task force then left the relative security of our Base Camp and ventured out into what was acknowledged as enemy territory – especially during the hours of darkness. The enemy was out there. Where? How many? Who, among the Vietnamese people we encountered, were the enemy? We were soon to find out. The enemy would choose to contest this daytime excursion and attempt at changing the rules of territorial ownership. It would prove to be the 2/2’s first really big scrap since arriving in Vietnam; thus, the first major scrap for the 3rd Brigade in its AO.
As we headed out onto Highway 13 and into the boonies my mind raced with thoughts related to this, my first combat experience. “What am I doing here? I am a fighter pilot! How will I perform in hand-to-hand combat against a fanatic VC? Will my M-16 work at a crucial time? Why won’t the butterflies in my stomach go away? Am I going to be sick? Lord; don’t let me be sick. Will I meet the challenge?” I was out of my element – the comfortable, familiar cockpit of the F-100. I was a fish out of water, a partridge out of his pear tree! All these thoughts filled my mind as we ventured out that November morning. Highway 13! I am not superstitious...I am not...am not!
The road clearing continued along the route and in the bush. Wherever the Battalion CO went, he wanted “his”AF FAC and ROMAD. Keith was in constant contact with the 3rd Brigade ALO at our Base Camp and the III Corps DASC at Bien Hoa in case we needed instant air support. No sweat! We would have instant air support for the Battalion CO if he (we) should need it.
Day one and night one, 10 November came and went. No sweat, except for the tropical heat and the constant 100% alert for the enemy. The next bush, the next curve, the next bridge, or the next moment may explode with hoards of VC or NVA soldiers bent on cutting us (me) to pieces with their machine guns, rifle fire, grenades, mines and booby traps. “Ambush” – the dreaded word! But not today, not 10 November. No sweat – yet!
11 November, the second day, came. It was very much a carbon copy of the previous day. Third Brigade medics and good-will teams spent these two days in Ap Bau Bang treating the villagers’ illnesses and injuries, providing food and clothing, and caring for their other needs. We were now located on the southwestern edge of Ap Bau Bang as night time approached. Company B was a few miles to the north. It was time to “circle the wagons” for the night.
Each element of the task force moved off the road to the west about 200 yards and began to dig in. A few of the APCs with their .50 caliber machine guns were stationed around our perimeter. Patrols moved outside the position to provide security and early warning in the event of an attack. The perimeter was about 200 to 300 yards in diameter. With the augmentees, our force probably contained about 300 personnel.
Keith positioned our FAC jeep within 10 yards of the Command Element foxhole. We dug shallow trenches under the rear of our jeep in order to be handy to the radios located back there. We also needed to be ready to roll if the Army instantly decided to move out – which experience had taught us that they were inclined to do without so much as a thought of consulting with us. Positioning ourselves under our jeep was a great mistake that I came to realize later. The FAC jeep actually offered no protection and was in fact a desired and readily identifiable target with its canvas top and multiple antennas. A real “magnet” as we unfortunately were to discovered later. If the Jeep had been blown up by a direct hit, so would have been Keith and I. The VC and NVA were well aware of what the FACs and ROMADs with their O-1 aircraft and radio FAC jeeps meant to them – a rain of guns, bombs, rockets, and napalm from the sky!
Thursday night 11 November was hardly different from the previous night. One ear listened to the radios, our link to the outside world of our Base Camp and DASC. The other ear listened for strange noises. One eye was kept open to catch the first sight of a VC or NVA infiltrator, and the other eye tried to get a little sleep. I though the night would never end!
Daylight – Friday 12 November, about 0600, Bau Bang, Vietnam. “Made it through another night,” I was thinking to myself. But I was very soon to have some serious doubts about the day! We had just begun to stir in preparation for the third day’s road clearing activities. I was looking forward to getting back to our Base Camp again; to a clean “comfortable” canvas GI cot; cold shower from a 55-gallon drum; cold shave from my helmet; and the harassment of an occasional sniper or mortar round.
“Crack”! Was that rifle fire? Another! There was one over there! A few more cracked in another direction. Soon rifle fire was rapidly increasing in intensity as the sounds encircled our position. Then came the unmistakable sound of the “fifties” on the APCs. There was no doubt that we were going to have a different kind of day.
It was determined later that we had become surrounded during the night by what the intelligence folks estimated to be at least a regiment of 1,200 or more NVA regulars plus hard core VC – an estimated total enemy force of about 2,000. Those were not favorable odds for our augmented Company of 300 or so troops. I understand that the enemy was initially engaged by one of our night patrols that had been posted beyond our perimeter for just such a purpose – to prevent an enemy surprise attack on the position proper. I believe the patrol was able to return to our perimeter although overwhelmingly out numbered.
I immediately proceeded to the Battalion CO’s position, ready to call for air support if he so requested. He was a no-nonsense commander, and a great tactical air advocate. I remember that he had a favorite nickname, which he used for most everyone; “Buster,” and he occasionally addressed his FAC (me) as such. Our Base Camp at Lai Khe had already been informed by my ROMAD who was immediately on our radio talking with the TACP at 3rd Brigade Headquarters. The intensity of the enemy attack continued to increase. The Battalion CO wanted tactical air support. That was our cue! When our request was transmitted, we were informed that we would have fighters immediately. We were receiving constant reports of the heaviest enemy assaults around the perimeter. They were using mortars, rockets, and direct frontal assaults. Their main thrust was shifted indiscriminately around our perimeter to keep us off balance and/or to find a point in which to breach our defense. Our position was about 600 yards southwest of the village of Ap Bau Bang in what was once a rubber plantation. The rows of trees were gone, but in their place the scrub brush had grown up in the rows to about shoulder height making observation of the perimeter and even the immediate area extremely difficult.
In order for a FAC to direct airstrikes against an enemy, he must know precisely where the enemy or the target is located. I was constantly crawling between the command foxhole and the FAC Jeep. Keith was dug in and monitoring all four radios. The only way I could observe any portion of the perimeter was to stand up on the hood of our FAC Jeep. Even then observation was minimal at best. I did this a few times then realized what a fool thing I was doing. I was still unable to observe the perimeter sufficiently. Going to the perimeter would be pointless because the hot spots were shifting irregularly about the perimeter as the enemy probed various locations. FACing can be done most effectively from the air. No doubt about it! Although our FACs and ALOs had been trying to convince Army ground commanders that FACing from the air would be more productive for them, many like my Battalion CO, wanted their FAC with them on the ground.
Fighter aircraft were on the way! A FAC had launched from Lai Khe in an O-1. He would soon be overhead where he could more readily see the enemy and direct the airstrikes. The airborne FAC who arrived was Sidewinder 32, the 3rd Brigade FAC who worked with the Brigade ALO. He was a superb FAC and seemed to have a natural talent for the job. As the Battalion CO informed me of the heaviest concentration of enemy fire, I would relay the information to Sidewinder 32 and keep him informed of the ground situation. He would quickly identify the enemy positions, and dispense airstrikes forthwith.
The attack seemed to intensify during the first two to three hours then remain steady for most of the remainder of the six-hour fight.
Shortly after the attack began, it was apparent that this was much more than a small VC harassment action. Our requests for immediate air support were quickly approved and dispatched. We were informed that due to the intensity of the attack and overwhelming odds against us, that we would have all available tactical air diverted to us that morning. Tactical airstrikes were provided continuously until the attack began to abate shortly after 1100. Sidewinder 32 was airborne over us most of the time. Reinforcements from our 3rd Brigade Base Camp at Lai Khe were unable to come to our aid. Company B that was northwest of Ap Bau Bang was unable to assist. I can tell you unequivocally to a man, that on the morning of 12 November, those AF, Navy, Marine and Vietnamese pilots were the heroes of the day. But I want to quickly add that the troops on the perimeter and the APC crews with their .50 caliber machine guns initially saved the day as they absorbed the brunt of the early attacks around our perimeter. The planner who included those APCs in the task force has my gratitude forever. Chances are that he was never acknowledged, or thanked, for his foresight.
Sometime during peak activity, Sidewinder 32 discovered an enemy position inside the southwest corner of the berm surrounding Bau Bang. The VC were firing rockets at us from the position. The rocket launcher and crew were protected by the berm around the village. I advised the Battalion CO. He was naturally reluctant to attack or fire on the position because of the certain destruction of the village. This was the very village where our Medics and civil action teams were treating the villagers and handing out food, candy, and clothing the previous two days! Of course the NVA and VC had probably threatened the villagers if they assisted the Americans or disclosed their plans and positions to us.
Before long the villagers began to evacuate Bau Bang to the north and south along Highway 13. With the NVA and VC using their village as a fortification to launch rocket and mortar attacks against us, it was not difficult for the villagers to forecast their eventual fate. Unfortunately, as the villagers (now refugees) crowded the highway to the north and south, they were traversing ground to the east of our perimeter that was hotly contested at the moment. The NVA and VC used the refugees to great advantage knowing that we wouldn’t fire into them.
At one time when Keith and I were in our foxholes behind and partially under our jeep talking to the Sidewinder 32, there was a muffled explosion immediately in front of us. We were instantly covered with a cloud of dust and dirt. The shock and concussion left us momentarily bewildered. As the dust cleared, I noticed a twisted chunk of metal like a peeled banana laying about a foot in front of my face. I tossed it over my head into our jeep in order to have it checked later. I also noticed that the ground was disturbed about 20-25 feet in front of us. My ROMAD discovered shortly thereafter that one of our radios was inoperative. Then we noticed an inch-deep dent in the steel body of our jeep only about four to six inches over my head – a dent I would have been wearing on my forehead had it been six inches lower! There were several holes in the canvas top of the Jeep. It was immediately after this incident that Sidewinder 32 told us that “they” were firing at us from the southwest corner of Bau Bang. I was half a step ahead of him. I knew “they” were firing at us; only I didn’t know from where. One mortar round knocked the set out of Keith’s ring!
Later back at Base Camp I would have the Intelligence Section check out the twisted metal object that I tossed into the FAC jeep during the battle. They determined it to be the rocket motor housing from an RPG. This particular rocket had an armor-piercing warhead. I somewhat jokingly commented that it had all of my initials, “GRP,” only out of proper sequence; otherwise it might have connected. The forward directed shaped charge of the armor-piercing warhead had dug into the ground in front of us where it then detonated. If it had been an anti-personnel warhead, it would have hurled shrapnel in every direction and I’m sure I would not be telling this story. Thank you again, Lord!
In the heat of the battle, Keith was very busy. In addition to our tasks with the air- strikes, he also found time to assist the Battalion Artillery FO with communications and target coordination. We also needed Dustoff to evacuate the wounded. He assisted in coordinating the requests. The NVA and VC loved the Dustoffs and the Jolly Greens. They were sitting ducks; extremely vulnerable targets when low, slow, hovering, or on the ground picking up wounded or survivors. The red-cross markings on the Dustoffs were a dead give away for the NVA and VC gunners. In my book, those Dustoff and Jolly Green crews were another group of professionals who never received just rewards for their heroic deeds, except for the satisfaction of a job well done and lives saved.
The Dustoff eventually made it through the ground fire to a pickup point about 40-50 yards or so from our FAC position. Keith, with full knowledge of the Dustoff’s magnetic attraction for heavy ground fire, retrieved several wounded soldiers and placed them aboard the helicopter. Eyewitnesses stated that he performed with no regard for his own safety. He was awarded the Silver Star for his actions on that day. In fact, he was one of the first of only ten CCTers to receive that award.
Meanwhile, the rocket launcher from Bau Bang was tearing us up. Other prime targets were our APCs with their .50 caliber machine guns and our 105 mm Howitzers. The NVA and VC were so close and numerous that the APC gunners and Howitzers were firing point blank into the advancing enemy.
I witnessed the destruction of one of our APCs. It was a few yards west of my FAC position and I happened to be looking at it the instant it was hit by an enemy rocket. The force, blast, and inferno it created are indescribable. The top hatch blew off and went spiraling straight up in a flat spin for about 50 feet, then as though attached by a bungee-cord, spiraled right back down onto the APC. I could see directly into the APC. It was a furnace – white hot! It burned for 45 minutes or so. The driver and gunner had no chance.
The Battalion CO decided that it was time to take out the rocket launcher and mortars, Bau Bang notwithstanding. The village’s fate was sealed either with or without their collusion. It was them or us! He gave the word, which I relayed to Sidewinder 32 overhead. You could almost detect the sound of relief in his voice when I told him the Battalion CO wanted the rocket launcher taken out. He obtained the strike authority necessary to attack the village. As I said before, the villagers knew it was only a matter of time before we would have to strike, and the Battalion CO had delayed as long as he dared in order to give the villagers time to evacuate.
Within minutes Sidewinder 32 had a flight of F-100s over Bau Bang – and the rocket launcher. Airstrikes were not normally flown over the heads of, or toward, friendly forces to minimize the chance of friendly fire incidents. This airstrike would have to be flown over the village toward our position to the southwest because of the protection afforded the rocket launcher and crew by the berm. The berm would protect the launcher crew from a long, left or right impact. It would require a direct hit on the launcher. A “long bomb” would send the bomb over the berm toward our position.
Sidewinder 32 identified the launcher position to the F-100 flight and received their acknowledgement of the location. After being cleared in hot, the lead F-100 pilot smartly rolled in and splattered a napalm bomb squarely on top of the rocket launcher and crew. Sidewinder 32 then went to work on the mortar positions and enemy troops in the village. It seemed pretty much downhill for the enemy from that point on. The NVA and VC knew they had a sanctuary in that village – even if only for a short time. Willing or unwilling villager assistance to the NVA and VC smacks in the face of our efforts in the village the previous day. It was a screwy war.
At one time about mid-morning – the enemy almost breached our perimeter. I expected to see swarms of charging NVA and VC overrunning our position at any moment. Suddenly I was surprised to see an APC backing through the brush from the southwest toward our FAC foxhole. The gunner was still firing away. I’m sure he was firing at near point blank range although I could see very little through the brush. Keith and I scrambled out of our foxholes to avoid permanent APC track marks on our fatigues. We figured our jeep was a goner! Fortunately, the APC began to move forward toward the perimeter, still firing away. For all I know, the NVA and VC could have been just on the other side of the bushes. Of course the gunner and driver of the APC would be able to see them from their positions in the APC. I’m sure they had to backtrack to keep the enemy at bay and from getting behind them.
Eventually Sidewinder 32 had to return to refuel. He transmitted to me that he would see me back at Base Camp. I guess things were not all that certain yet and I made the comment, “If I get back.” He chided me for the remark and I realized how defeatist it must have sounded. It was an uncomfortable feeling without Sidewinder 32. Our Base camp at Lai Khe was only about five to ten miles away so he was back soon. About 1100 the action began to diminish and by 1200 it was over! The last round had been fired. Everything was now quiet. The enemy’s numerous assaults had been repelled and battle-damage was being assessed. We still had work to do – specifically, the road clearing.
I suddenly realized that I was a little queasy. I sat down by a bush for a few moments and remembered that I had not so much as breathed a prayer during the whole battle – in fact I had no time to be really frightened until now! Now in this moment of quietness, I offered prayers of praise and thanks to God for Keith’s and my safety, the safety of the Task Force, and for the victory. In the immediate area there were 198 enemy dead and six captured. Aircraft over the area reported many more dead around and beyond the perimeter. I either read or heard later that enemy casualties were estimated at 500 plus. We had 16 friendlies killed and 38 wounded. A later report put our total wounded at about 100.
While discussing post-battle matters with the Battalion OPSO at his foxhole, he looked at me and said that I needed to see the Medic. My right ear was bleeding. It turned out to be only a small scratch on my ear but blood was in and around my ear and on my neck. The next day and for several days afterward, my ear and neck were black and blue. Apparently shrapnel from that RPG had been closer than I thought.
After cleaning up our area and breaking camp we prepared to assume our position in the convoy for return to Base Camp. We moved out toward Highway 13 but had to hold up to allow 5th ARVN Division units to pass through north bound. Recollection has faded a bit but it seems they were an hour or two passing through. I do not know if they knew what they had just missed; but they surely did when they passed through the smoldering remnants of the village of Bau Bang.
It was almost dark before we were finally formed in convoy on Highway 13 for the trip back to Lai Khe. Concern was expressed that we would be caught out after dark on the highway prior to reaching Base Camp. Not a recommended situation! It was road clearing all over again; except this time we were clearing our own way and not for the ARVN. Anti-ambush patrols had to be sent out ahead. Night time caught us but we didn’t stop. No “circling the wagons” tonight. We pressed on painstakingly slowly. The convoy halted many times for what seemed an eternity while potential ambush sites and possible mine were neutralized. The jungle was so close to the highway in places that when we stopped, branches hung over into our Jeep. If an NVA or VC soldier had sprung out of the jungle he would have been in our Jeep before I saw him. We were all hoping that they were all holed up somewhere licking very serious wounds with no time or stomach for a counter-attack.
We arrived at Lai Khe around midnight without incident. Needless to say the late night arrival was a glorious relief.
The epilog to my Bau Bang story is based on an exchange of letters between my wife, Pat, and me shortly after I returned to Lai Khe.
During the Bau Bang battle, Pat was back at our home at Cannon with our two boys, Norris and Robert. Knowing the story of Bau Bang would get back to her, I wrote her a little of the details and tried to assure her that I had indeed only received a very minor scratch from the encounter. I was afraid that if word reached her other than from me, it would have gone through many modifications and would have me critically wounded and near death. At about that same time she had also written me. Each of us was unaware of the other’s letter. Her letter stated that during church service on the night of 10 November our pastor interrupted his presentation and said something to the effect that, “You all know that we have one of our very own in Vietnam, Captain Partridge. We have no idea what danger he may be in at this very moment. But I have a definite feeling that we should have a special prayer for his safety right now.”
It is not out of character to have special prayers for congregation members away in service or others with special needs, but consider this. My pastor felt this special need on my behalf at that moment and interrupted his presentation to offer a prayer for me. The time would have been about 1830 Clovis time on Wednesday evening. Vietnam time is 13 hours ahead of Clovis. That would have put his prayer for me at about 0730 the morning of 11 November Bau Bang-time, right in the middle of our operation and 24 hours before the Bau Bang battle. Reflect on the close proximity of the RPG rocket explosion, the scratch on my ear, the grazing of my cheek, the dent in the jeep’s steel body just over my head. Thank you God, thank you Pastor, and thank you folks at Central Baptist Church!