Duc Co I, II, and III, and the Ia Drang Valley
submitted by: Alva Leon Matheson
Then Captain Norman Schwarzkopf was an advisor with the Battalion of the ABNDIV that was sent to Duc Co in December of 1965 to relieve mounting pressure on the outpost. The Camp and its airstrip had been receiving serious small arms, mortar, and rocket fire from the surrounding hills and jungle for weeks, and, the severity of the fire had been steadily increasing. I was there as the Battalion ALO/FAC.
Duc Co was one of the many outposts left over from French Colonial times. A dirt airstrip just long enough for C-123s to operate led right up to the main gate. It was little more than a wide spot in a road that ran west into Cambodia only a few kilometers away, and east into the Central Highlands. Although not in use since the departure of the French, control of the roadbed would have been a bonanza for PAVN units moving south. In any case, and although they were not believed, Delta and SOG intelligence reports became more and more insistent that PAVN forces were supporting the VC operating near the Camp.
Upon arrival at the Province Chief’s HQ in Pleiku, the Battalion CO laid out his operating plan. It included enumeration of the support he would need from ARVN and US channels, and also contained his requirement for fighter cover of the airlift of the Battalion to the airstrip at Duc Co. A glitch developed almost immediately when the US Advisor to the Province Chief vetoed the request. The issue got elevated within hours to MACV and the JGS. It was quickly resolved in our favor, and fighters were used effectively to suppress incoming fire during the arrival of the Battalion at Duc Co.
It was obvious that we couldn’t operate from the Duc Co strip due to the constant incoming, so I had to leave the TACP at Pleiku. Because I only had one O-1, I also had to enlist the assistance of the local Province FACs to cover for me during refueling and rearming operations. That they did, without hesitation.
As soon as the Battalion arrived at Duc Co, they began conducting ever-widening sweeps around the Camp. The Battalion CO and Schwarzkopf were of one mind and were aggressive in seeking out the VC. At first there was a lot of sign but little contact. FACs were in the air whenever the Battalion was in action, but few targets developed. The VC was careful not to present a coherent target, and they were masters at melting away.
As time passed, sniping from prepared positions increased significantly. A few prisoners were taken and a picture started to form. A full-blown attack on the outpost was in the works. In fact, we were later to learn that reports from SOG and Delta Teams had been predicting the action for weeks. Unfortunately, their reports had not been taken seriously.
The Vietnamese response consisted of reinforcing the ABNDIV Battalion at Duc Co by opening the long-closed road to Duc Co, and sending heavy equipment to Duc Co to extend and improve the defensive perimeter. I was sent back to Tan Son Nhut to change clothes and pick up another O-1. Upon my return to Pleiku several days later, I dropped into the middle of the same issue regarding preplanned Tacair. The Province FACs were used to loosing the argument, and seemed not overly concerned. However, Norm and the Battalion CO had come in from Duc Co for the planning, and they were not about to be denied the air cover they had come to depend upon during detached operations. They had to throw their weight around again to get the air laid on.
Two airborne companies, a company of ARVN tanks, an engineering company, and two platoons of Rangers were planned to escort a number of 6X6s with supplies. The road convoy left well before dawn. Route 14 south to the intersection with Route 19 and west about halfway to Duc Co was expected to reasonably secure. The PAVN would not expect the ARVN to try to get to Duc Co by road, and local intelligence indicated that the few VC in the area had disappeared. In fact, we later realized that they were out at Duc Co in support of PAVN moving into the Ia Drang Valley.
The Province FACs had been to look in on the convoy through the morning, and I took off a little after noon. By mid-afternoon the security forces had deployed ahead and on both sides of the overgrown roadbed. Fords had been constructed through several streams, many road cuts had been filled, and the convoy was about 15-20 klicks east of Duc Co.
The Advisor with the Convoy CO told me they were getting reports of activity in front of and to the sides of the convoy. The convoy was halted and patrols had been sent out to probe possible ambush positions. Unfortunately, the tanks had moved forward to a little high spot in the road, and the engineers were bunched up to the rear with the trucks. The convoy was badly spread out. From the air the problem was painfully obvious. To make matters worse, the lead elements of the ABNDIV security forces had passed the intersection of a trail leading to the south toward the Ia Drang Valley. The Convoy CO sensed that the enemy was moving around his forces but they were not receiving fire. It was getting spooky.
VR of the area was tricky. A little open Elephant Grass, some double and triple canopy, and years and years of overgrown jungle. At times I thought I could see movement on the overgrown trail. I’d look again, and all would be quiet. The troops on the ground would ask, “Red Marker, they’re all around us, have you got a visual?” They thought most of the activity was north and west of them, but in that direction there was little cover and the only visual I had was of friendlies. That trail to the south was getting weird. I’d catch a flicker, then nothing. “OK,” I thought, “I’ve got to open this thing up. The troops are getting nervous. The potential is too big.”
I dropped down to the east and south behind a little ridge, then turned back west and north toward the friendlies. I popped through a little draw and, balls to the wall, drove up the trail. At first, the figures with branches on their helmets and backpacks kept moving three at a time, then all stopping, then the next three moving ahead of the first three, and then all stopping. Each time they stopped they were nearly invisible against the jungle next to the trail. Then they realized their cover was blown. Bees started buzzing and popcorn started popping, but at last, I had my target. They were PAVN! Gray-green uniforms – all alike. The first PAVN I had seen in SEA, and we were eyeball to eyeball!
Flashing at 100 knots and 10 feet over the friendlies I used calm, cool, standard radio procedures, and called for air. OK, so maybe I was screaming. As I climbed out over more peaceful terrain, my ROMAD and the DASC at Pleiku were busy rounding up CAS. We had an advantage when it came to priorities, an advantage that other ARVN units did not always enjoy. Because our Army Advisors were always with the unit on the ground, any TIC was a US TIC. I assigned the situation an even higher priority. They had had the audacity to fire at me, a FAC!
Within barely more than seconds, the air started arriving – first our CAP, and then DASC diversions. I marked the friendlies, described the deployment of the hostiles, and got things organized in the air; working to keep dissimilar air assets out of each other’s way and hopefully minimize friendly-fire problems. As soon as the fighters started working, all hell broke loose on the ground. The folks on the ground were asking us to put the air in close. It had always been axiomatic in our relationship that the closer they wanted the air, the more perilous was their perceived situation. On this particular day, they were asking me to put it very close indeed. In fact, impromptu, although still relatively small human wave attacks were threatening to overrun their hastily prepared positions. Fortunately, the PAVN had been just a little late getting into position to ambush the convoy. We never did figure out if they had planned specifically to go after the convoy, or if it became a target of opportunity for them as they were moving to attack Duc Co. In any event, they were heavily armed and were able to bring mortars and other crew served weapons immediately on line.
When their bombs were gone each flight worked their 20 mm south down both sides of the trail. Reported KBAs were in the hundreds, but I believe that the actual numbers were much higher, and that the fighters, strafing both sides of that trail, left uncounted dead in places where we could not see them.
When I was getting close to fumes a Province FAC showed up. I had already turned the targets over to the fighters and they were providing their own separation while I relayed corrections from the troops on the ground. I briefed the Province FAC as I headed to Pleiku and continued monitoring the situation until RTB. As I recall, the Province FAC picked up the ball and controlled the wild action without a hitch. Later in the day, the PAVN broke contact, and the convoy made it to Duc Co just before dusk.
Things were very, very quiet around Duc Co for the next week or two. I trolled around the area for several days, but it remained quiet even as the ABNDIV continued to work the area around the Camp. At about this time intelligence from multiple sources, including our contact, finally fixed a PAVN division, or more, moving into the Ia Drang Valley just south of Duc Co. Ultimately, Gene McCutchan sent my relief, and I headed for Bien Hoa to trade in our tired little airplane for a new one.
While at Saigon we were advised that our part was mostly over and the 1st Cav would be taking over in the Ia Drang Valley. MACV and the JGS developed what was intended to be a coordinated response using US and ABNDIV forces. Unfortunately, coordination was only rudimentary at best. The US and Vietnamese forces had no direct staff or field-level coordination. The US Advisors to the ABNDIV attempted to coordinate and provide the 1st Cav with current information. They were advised that no assistance was needed and that 1st Cav organic resources would be sufficient to their needs. The rest is sad and ugly history. The Cav got one of the worst thrashings of the SEA experience. Companies of troops and UH-1s were put down in the Ia Drang Valley and were decimated. Worse, they didn’t seem able to learn. Next day, they would do it all over again. Worse still, they refused to make use of CAS, insisting that they could handle the job with organic fires. Finally, after several days, CAS was tasked and the ABNDIV was inserted on a ridge to the west of the Ia Drang Valley, along the Cambodian Border. MACV was a bit concerned about their actual location, but the ABNDIV Staff made the point that maps of the area were inaccurate and that the troops were certainly in SVN. Actually, they were in Cambodia and they knew it. In any case, with US firepower and the ABNDIV on their heels, the PAVN finally melted back into Cambodia.
This is why I say our experience at Duc Co and in the Ia Drang Valley had a direct and valuable effect on the future conduct of joint and combined operations. Captain Norman Schwarzkopf had to sit and watch as US soldiers got fed into a meat grinder in the name of “roles and missions.” Twenty-five years later, General Schwartzkopf didn’t let that happen in Iraq!