Five Stories – More Amusing Now Than They Were Then-Red Hat Lo
submitted by: Alva Leon Matheson
Included in our TACP were four FACs. They were Red Marker (LtCol McCutchan), Red Marker 02 (Major Oliver P. “Bud” Fisher), Red Marker 03 (Captain Wayne Kanouse), and Red Marker 05 (yours truly). We had two ROMADs, Staff Sergeant John Balasco and Airman 1st Class Humphries. We also had a crew chief, and our two Vietnamese drivers, Luong and Phuong. Our equipment included one MRC-108 with its generator trailer, two transportation jeeps and two O-1s. It was a big operation for us! The area we operated from had a “fabric” covered runway that, when wet, had the traction of greased owl-shit. Landing on that sucker with a little morning dew on it was more than exciting.
Editor’s Note: In fact, the only Red Marker FAC not on the mission was your editor (Mike Morea). I was about a week from DEROS, and was holding down the fort at Tan Son Nhut and doing some of the minimal outprocessing required prior to departing for home.
The operational plan was set up personally by the Division CO. Red Marker took care of the air plan including coordination with the DASC and establishing rendezvous points and call sign procedures. It was a sizeable, well planned operation, and we had every expectation of running into lots of VC as well as NVA Regulars.
The Army Advisors set up a system whereby we could always locate them. It involved pre-identified grid intersections that had American automobile names like Buick, Chevy, or Cadillac. When we took off, we knew exactly where our ground troops were since that information was either part of the preflight briefing or we received it from the FAC being relieved. On occasion, we received it from the ground troops directly using the “Car System.” To pinpoint a location you could say, e.g., “Where are you from “Oldsmobile?” The answer might come back, “Red Marker Five, we’re two and one-half down, one and one-half left.” Bingo, we knew right where they were and we could build an air support plan to fit the location.
The Senior Advisor on the ground was always with the senior Vietnamese commander, so when you contacted him you knew you were talking with the man closest to the commander on the ground. The Senior Advisor’s personality determined how much I communicated with lower-ranking Advisors (those assigned to battalion and company-level.) In this case, I was talking only to the Senior Advisor.
Red Marker had set up continuous A-1 cover with perfect close air support and antipersonnel ordnance. The two-ship A-1 flights had called in at their orbit point with altitude, ordnance, loiter time, etc. Having those guys on station set us up for a very rapid response in case the Red Hats ran into what they hoped they would.
Well, there was this Advisor, a major, I believe, who was a Frenchman with experience gained in Algeria. You could tell he was a Frenchman but you couldn’t tell him much – sort of like a fighter pilot! I checked in with him, requested his location, and rogered the information. I flew over the area and found a lot of trees, streams, and heavy foliage, but not one Red Hat anywhere. It wasn’t long before I guessed, from the large difference from the pre-briefed location to the stated position, that something was wrong. I said something like, “Golly, you’ve moved a good distance from your last briefed location.” Thinking that someone may have changed the reference points without letting us know, I asked him where he was from a different reference point. From his answer and my questions, everyone, both friendly and unfriendly, soon knew where the “automobiles” were located. At that point I didn’t care if the NVN or VC knew the automobile locations, we could fix that later. I needed to know where my Frenchman and his unit were!
I flew a wider and wider circle and tried to get him to respond when he heard my engine. Nothing! I asked him if he would consider popping a smoke. He said, “No!” and I couldn’t really blame him. So there I was, A-1s loaded for bear orbiting nearby, able to respond almost instantly in case we got into contact, and I didn’t know where my troops were. I could see explaining to Red Marker that the problem preventing me from helping the Red Hats was, “I didn’t know their position.” Not a pleasant prospect!
I called our TACP and told them to recheck with the DTOC and see if they had changed reference point call signs or locations and to double check where the Frenchman was thought to be. The questions caused the top US Army Advisor to become concerned and directly involved. He used his radio channels to talk to the ground troops, and apparently got the same answer because the ROMADs relayed the same position to me that the Frenchman had given me. Now we were head to head! An experienced French-trained guerrilla fighter and an AF captain with a lot of flying time but about as much time in the woods as your average Boy Scout.
I’m sure we won the award for most radio transmissions made in a single afternoon. Any potential enemy certainly must have been eagerly anticipating attacking a unit that spent all its time debating its position, but we had to get the problem solved. Among other things, we needed an accurate position so we could register artillery support for the night.
Well, it took us most of the afternoon, three smoke grenades which slowly wafted up through the multi-layered tree canopy, and a lot of references to river bends and elevation changes to convince my French friend that he was indeed where I said he was.
They made it through the night, but the next day, they relocated to a new position before the enemy had an opportunity to capitalize on the previous day’s confusion!