Reflections of an Aussie ALO
submitted by: Alva Leon Matheson
There was absolutely no air opposition in RVN, and neither the VC nor the NVA had shoulder- launched SAMs. AAA was certainly a problem, more so in areas surrounding The Ho Chi Min Trail, than for example in III Corps area where I worked. The main threat to our operations came from occasional 37 mm, but more often from 12.7 mm and the ubiquitous AK-47, whereas perhaps the main threat to our aircraft came from almost nightly attacks on our revetted aircraft parks with 122 mm rockets, or mortars. Fortunately neither were precisely aimed and did, in the main, random though sometimes serious damage.
We made our most effective contribution when correctly employed as part of a Team. FACs got to know their AOs like the backs of their hands. FACs provided up to the minute visual reconnaissance, and had the best of communications with ground elements in contact, the Army command structure, and air and artillery resources. Locally established liaisons with Army Aviation resources also enabled FACs to call in immediate helicopter support, gunships, medevac, logistics, and special reconnaissance. At Lai Khe, we found it useful to keep a FAC as duty ALO with the Army Commander and his Battle staff whenever possible. This meant a FAC, not otherwise engaged in his primary mission, would be airborne with the Commander in his C&C chopper. FACs attended planning activities and intelligence briefings, and were always up to date with the progress of operations. Continuous liaison at all levels promoted trust and loyalty.
Airborne with the Brigade Commander one morning we came across what we discerned to be a bunker complex in the woods within range of artillery from a nearby FSB. The Commander, a gung-ho West Pointer, decided to keep the peoples’ heads down by engaging the complex with his M40 grenade launcher. I had the window seat, so he issued me a spare M40 and we proceeded to attack the target. I warned him of the dire risk in making multiple passes from the same direction, height, and speed. Finally, on about the seventh pass, the people down below stepped out with their AKs and stitched us up! Unknown number of hits, hydraulic oil everywhere, but no one hurt, and we limped into the FSB. An HLH was needed to get the chopper out!
Probably the most go get ‘em, albeit a trifle stupid, action I ever saw an Army Commander take was performed by then Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton III.
This gent is a direct descendent of the other two famous George S. Pattons and had command of the US 11th ACR in 1969. One of our Aussie FACs, Flying Officer Dick Kelloway, was attached to that unit for a while. On this occasion the 11th was attached under command to the Third Brigade of the Big Red One, and I happened to be moping about in the area of his activity in my OV–10. He was in his chopper directing a twin row of tanks though the sticks towards a creek line. A tirade of invective on the frequency attracted my attention. He was quite excited about a very small group of NVA who apparently had scuttled into this creek line ahead of the tanks. Being unable, despite considerable urging, to get his men on the ground to dismount and pursue the villains, he had his pilot land next to the creek. He jumped out brandishing his twin pearl handled Colts, personally grabbed two of the infiltrators, and dragged them back to the chopper as his prisoners! By now I was overhead and could not believe what I was seeing. It could easily have been a regimental bunker complex, but who can argue with success! Worth a Silver Star that one!
On another occasion, on a three-battalion night insertion, I and my USAF mate in the back seat were airborne in our OV-10 prepping the LZ. When the slicks carrying the grunts started to arrive our activities slowed a little until one LZ proved to be hot. We had two sets of fighters on CAP with high-drags and napalm, and we expended them to ease things a little for the boys on the ground. The Brigade Commander had been there in his chopper since the first ball was bowled, and was running out of fuel. He knew we in the FAC aircraft were in contact with all his Commanders so he handed over command of the operation to me while he went for fuel. He said, “ Sidewinder-31, I’m giving you command of a U.S. Army Brigade.” “Hell,” I thought! Happily he was back in about 20 minutes. I did the best I could with coordination while Captain Mike Poehler in the back seat handled the FAC work. Fortunately, we got away with it! I offer this story primarily as an example of the level of understanding and trust which we all enjoyed at Lai Khe.
Part 2 - Observations from a Political Perspective
After all these years convictions remain. No matter what the size of the conflict, if you are in it, it’s only the immediate surrounds which count.
One clear difference between Vietnam and the two World Wars was that in Vietnam, you served 12 months to the day. No one could make any one go back for a second tour, although often, and for different reasons, many did so. In WWII you were there until someone decided you were either incapable for some reason, no longer required, or the war was over! There is a huge difference in the mental approach to these two different sets of circumstances. As a consequence, although as in any war, I suppose, there was plenty of traumatic stress in Vietnam, I have difficulty accepting that Vietnam could have left a legacy of so much more “post traumatic stress disorder.” Are we made of less stern stuff than our fathers and grandfathers?
I must do my bit to help dispel the claptrap that surrounds the justification for and success of the Vietnam War. For that reason, I believe in examining the War in the context of its time, and with the advantage of hindsight.
No one believed for long in the over-simplistic Domino Theory of Communist expansion through SEA and onwards towards Australia. Communism as an ideology was unlikely to succeed for many reasons. However, it was clear that the Communist Powers, both in China and the USSR, were intent on subjugating the region by military force; and if ideology helped, then so be it. Every action they took was in accord with that Policy.
Time was against the natural development of Communism. As the emerging nations: Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea progressed, Communism could be expected to emerge. It could also be expected to wither on the vine as economic development took place, provided that there was no external military threat to divert resources and stifle the natural instincts of the Asian people toward individuality in economic affairs. The war in Vietnam provided that time, and many people in Australia in the sixties recognized this truth. Today, one of those Communist powers is extinct. The other seeks to dominate by economic rather than military means, and Capitalism is alive and well throughout Asia!
Unfortunately, most of the media did not see things in that light, and set about a campaign of distortion regarding the conduct of the War. Compulsory conscription was necessary, but it did not help. Only anti-war sentiment was given exposure. When I returned to Australia in late 1969 my Church, the leading denomination church in Sydney, was actively supporting the NVA by sending them care packages. I regard myself as a Christian but those churchmen got it badly wrong, and I have not seriously been to church since.
I miss the flying. I miss the people and the wonderful loyalties of my RAAF days. I do not miss the bureaucracy. For now, retirement on the south coast of Western Australia has a lot going for it. The nearest traffic light is nearly 300 kilometers away, the grandchildren are near, and there is still a great deal of fun to be had. Life is good!