Chinese Road

submitted by: Alva Leon Matheson


The bad guys had retaken Nam Bac, and outside of a few isolated pockets of resistance, controlled everything north of the Mekong all the way into North Vietnam. The NVA had also made a major effort to complete Route 19. This was the road that ran from Dien Bien Phu across northern Laos down to the Nam Ou River. It looked as though eventually it would join up with the Chinese Road to the west at Moung Sai. Presently, it ended at the Nam Ou River. The facilities they constructed at this terminus point seemed to be logistic support structures where they unloaded and stored supplies for transport down the river by motorized barge. This became the major route for bringing supplies into MR-I. This area would also provide the FACs with lots of targets in the next year.
I felt most surprised by what had become known as the Chinese Road. The Chinese were building a super highway that ran from China down into Laos. The road passed through Moung Sing in Northwest Laos to Nam Tha, then down to Moung Sai. From there it followed the Beng River south down the valley to Pak Beng on the Mekong River. This road was considered one of the major construction feats in Laos and had received increasing attention from both the Thai and Laotian governments. This was mostly because no stated purpose existed for the road. What the Chinese intentions were may have been indicated by their determination to defend it.
Intel told us of an influx in sophisticated radar and triple-A in this area. We had reports of Firecan Radars being setup along the road all the way from China to the Mekong River that would be used to direct fire for batteries of 57 mm anti- aircraft guns. The valleys also showed traces of positions being cleared out for 37 mm guns, and the hilltop strong points had gun pits for ZPUs and 12.7 mm heavy machine guns.
I had heard about the road when I was engaged in the operation at Ban Houie Sai. The road was considered by the Air Force to be a high threat area and was off limits to just about everyone. The USAF wouldn’t even fly RF-4 photo recce missions on the road because of the reported triple-A threat. This made me all the more determined to see it for myself. Besides I was filled with curiosity to find out why everyone was so concerned about this one road. I flew up to Moung Sai and flew south down the Beng Valley towards the Mekong. Plainly, this stretch of the road was still under construction. I could see the road traces as the construction crews worked back towards each other from several spots along the route.
I had noticed from my observation of Route 19 when it was under construction that this was a technique the construction crews used and when they all linked up, the road was ready to use. Using this knowledge as a guide, the road looked as though it was nearly finished from Moung Sai to Na Tha and was finished between Nam Tha to Moung Sing. All along the route I could see several bridges under construction across valleys and streams in the area. The truck traffic was going all out in broad daylight.
The Embassy was unable to get any current photo-reconnaissance of the road. Especially since the Air Force wouldn’t fly because of the Rules of Engagement they had to follow. Without photos the triple-A danger was difficult to assess. This problem became critical later on when Air America had one of their C-123Ks beaconed into the Beng valley and shot down. As a result they sent one of their Volpars up the road to drop leaflets trying to find the crew. The aircraft immediately attracted a lot of attention from the gunners as soon as they started their run up the valley. The aircraft was hit right away by a direct burst from a 57 mm. Through sheer determination, the crew was able to bring the crippled aircraft back. Jim Rhyne their chief fixed-wing pilot, lost his leg in the encounter.
By the summer of 1969, the progress on the road was well along and approaching its terminus at Pak Beng. Our Intel guys in Vientiane were in the dark about what was going on in that part of MR-I and during one of our weekly AOC meetings, John Garrity asked me if it was possible to get close enough to the road to get pictures without getting shot up. I told him that I thought it could be done. The Ravens kept a pretty close check on the road on their occasional visual recce flights in the vicinity, and we hadn’t had any problems up to this point.
I was asked to come down to Vientiane for a special Intel briefing. John Garrity told me what he needed was as many pictures of the road that we could get. I took the aluminum case with the Pentax camera and the 300 mm lens with me back to LP. In our discussion, I asked John if he knew about the RT-28 (guppy) down at Udorn. I told him that this might be his answer to getting good pictures of the road. The Guppy had the same camera package that had been used in a RF- 84F mounted under the fuselage in the baggage compartment. The bulge from the way the cameras were mounted gave a pregnant look to the unarmed T-28 thus its Guppy name. The airplane had a great camera system. It had a large format 12-inch Forward Oblique, a nine-inch Vertical and a nine-inch Right Oblique – all capable of producing excellent pictures.
I returned to LP and gathered the Ravens together in the Big House and explained what Garrity wanted. I told them that we would use the U-17 and try to get the pictures from a stand- off position to minimize the risk. The first mission we flew was the first time that I had seen the road since my first days at LP. The progress that had been made was easy to see. We counted 50 trucks in the first 20 mile stretch that we photographed. Then Jerry Furche and Ed Gunter, two Ravens, flew several more missions to the area getting great pictures from up close to the road.
I took the film to Vientiane for processing. The pictures were good and what the Intel guys saw on the film only whetted their appetite for more and better pictures. Again, I was at one of the weekly AOC meetings in Vientiane when John Garrity came in and said that the Embassy badly wanted pictures of the Chinese Road and that we were authorized to use the Guppy. The job was first given to Joe Potter, but Col Tyrell overruled Joe flying the mission. He said that Joe was an MR-II guy and the road was in MR-I. Moody should fly it since it was in his area, and he should have a better feel for where the triple-A was located. All I could think was, “Thanks a lot, Colonel.”