Exasperations of a Political Conflict
submitted by: Alva Leon Matheson
For those first three months I flew O-1 aircraft out of Binh Thuy, a mainly VNAF base near Can Tho city. I thought the Bird Dog was a delightful aircraft for the job, in that it was slow enough to fly using back-trim and rudder to achieve a meandering flight path which was great during visual reconnaissance, since the pilot’s hands were left free to use binoculars and operate the radios. Its disadvantages were its slow speed (especially when trying to get to a contact) and the limited number of marker rockets that it carried. This was a real drawback in the Delta, because of the high dud rate when the rockets hit water or soggy ground. Smoke cans were carried in the cockpit as a backup, but these did not provide much smoke on the ground after burning while free falling from 1,500 feet. Moreover, they were the cause of some mild panic when accidentally dropped inside the cockpit, resulting in a 60 knot white cloud gyrating about the clear blue sky while the pilot tried to recover the burning can and throw it overboard.
At Binh Thuy the FAC flight comprised about five USAF pilots plus myself, and the only other American personnel there were Spooky gunship pilots and the maintenance teams for UH-1 Iroquois helicopters (or Hueys as they were called). Our AO was around Ben Tre, south of My Tho, and required nearly 45 minutes transit time to reach it. These first three months were the most active of my tour and ceased when President Nixon commenced the withdrawal of American personnel. I was flying in support of the 9th US Infantry Division, which was the first to be with- drawn—allegedly because the Mekong Delta was the most pacified AO in the country’s south. In reality, though, we were continually engaged in firefights right up to the Division’s date of withdrawal, and it was clear that the decision was purely a political one taken because of the lack of popular support for the war at home. It certainly was not based (as stated at the time) on a reduced level of enemy resistance, or success of the pacification program.
There was a clear lack of commitment on the part of the South Vietnamese army, the ARVN, towards taking the necessary ground action to win the war. Many times I observed them actively avoid contact with the enemy. Moreover, there was constant difficulty in securing the necessary clearances from the appropriate ARVN and government representatives to proceed with attacking various targets. While large areas of the Delta were declared free-fire zones, there was rarely any action in these areas. Targets of opportunity were usually located in populated areas but approval to hit these was generally denied. Towards the end of the 9th Division’s tour, when there clearly was suspicious or blatant enemy activity observed on the ground, some FACs used to claim to be receiving hostile ground fire as a way around the need to obtain ARVN clearances. Their expectations of receiving ground fire were usually realised once the enemy was attacked.
The accuracy of air power in the south was generally good, probably because of the old technology employed in such aircraft as the F-100, A-1, A-37 and F-5. The F-4 Phantom was the latest in the stable and carried a significant payload, but generally it was the most inaccurate of all. Not surprisingly, the more time a USAF pilot had in-country the better accuracy he exhibited. The Vietnamese pilots operated the A-1, A-37 and F-5 aircraft with generally outstanding accuracy as they progressed up the technology ladder, but with diminishing payload. The VNAF appeared to me to be more professional than the ARVN, and showed more commitment to ending the war.
Exasperation at the political restrictions imposed on certain targets was felt by all forces. This feeling has been portrayed in the film ‘Flight of the Intruder’, where aircrew were not allowed to attack central Hanoi although there were huge stockpiles of arms and equipment amassed there. Rather, they had to wait until targets were dispersed along the Ho Chi Minh Trail before engaging. I experienced similar frustrations when VC/NVA troops retreated into internationally owned rubber plantations, which were off-limits as far as the US Government was concerned. The political restrictions significantly encumbered the military effort.
Later I converted onto OV-10s, after the Bird Dogs were withdrawn from units in South Vietnam to operate in Laos and Cambodia, and I believe myself, Peter Larard and Pete Condon were the only three RAAF pilots to thus fly two aircraft types during our tour. The Bronco had the big advantage of better visibility, because it had a bubble canopy set well forward of the high lift wings which allowed the crew to see directly beneath the aircraft with only 10 degrees of bank applied. However, I’m sure this same feature gave the aircraft its name, because the crew got a hard ride during the clear air turbulence that developed in the middle of the day. This would be so severe that visual reconnaissance using binoculars was nearly impossible. Moreover, its handling characteristics at low speed (around 120-130 knots) required the use of spoilers to improve roll control, and this became a handful when trying to maneuver for a quick mark.
The main threat to my longevity was from persistent night-time rocket and mortar attacks on our base, which usually occurred around 2 am. Running for the bunker invariably entailed greater risk than lying face-down on the floor until there was a lull in the attack, when proper protection could be reached. The next most serious threat entailed adapting to US food, which was mostly dehydrated, tasteless and completely foreign. Who could forget the smell and taste of etherised eggs (injected as a preservative) and Weiner steaks (small tinned frankfurt-style sausages) cooking for breakfast.
The engagement that was probably the highlight of my tour occurred when a platoon of 30 men from Charlie Company of the 2nd/16th were ambushed while on patrol by a VC/NVA force estimated at more than 100 strong. Half of the platoon were killed or wounded in the initial contact. In responding to the request for immediate airpower, I ordered up three pairs of fighters each carrying a standard ramp-load of two Mk82 high drag bombs, two BLU-55 napalm droptanks and 20 mm cannon. More aircraft were subsequently called upon also.
In the ten-minute interval before the arrival of the first aircraft I began an artillery fire mission along the western front using all available guns, while simultaneously commencing a reinforcement and resupply mission by helicopters on the southern front. Hunter/killer teams of gunships also descended on the contact as the first jets checked in. The fighters were briefed on the situation and put to work using only napalm and guns, because of the close proximity between the friendly and enemy troops. The fire support mission and helicopter support effort had to be suspended during the air strike, which was mounted by six pairs of mostly F-100s and A-37s.
Because the engagement continued past dusk the firing on the ground was clearly visible to me, as was the declining volume of this fire after each fighter pass – a sure sign that the airpower was effective. The job of co-ordinating the fire mission, the helicopter mission and the hunter/killer teams (which were very aggressive) in with the air strikes was most difficult. I had Maj Leventis in the back seat doing my Phase 2 checkout. During the strikes, he worked the FM radios telling our boys what to expect while I was directing the fighters. In the heat of the battle, I clearly remember an A-37 VNAF lead saying “Speak slowly please, I am not an American you know” to which I replied “That’s alright Mate, neither am I”! The outcome of the battle was never really clear. While more than 100 enemy bodies were counted following the action, almost all of these were attributed to KIA or Army fire – very few were attributed to Airpower or KBA. This ongoing squabble with the Army over statistics was never satisfactorily resolved, and in the end had a negative effect on land engagements because it appeared to show that air power was not cost-effective. Subsequent to this action I was given two souvenirs, a bullet scored SKS rifle and an AK-51 with attached bayonet by an appreciative Platoon Commander, which now reside in No 3 Sqn RAAFs crewroom in Australia.
While I was at Lai Khe between June and December, there were three memorable incidents: One was a troops-in-contact situation that began in dense triple canopy jungle outside the range of artillery fire support and lasted two and a half days. The length of this engagement was itself unusual, because the enemy normally employed hit and run tactics. When friendly troops were finally able to secure the enemy position, it was discovered that the area contained a training and base camp facility which was so large that the enemy had needed the two days just to evacuate items of military significance.
Another incident arose from one of the regular attacks that the VC mounted on the north- bound vehicle convoys. After an earlier ambush, in which the enemy first destroyed a petrol tanker with an RPG then systematically engaged the following vehicles as these halted behind it concertina-style, the US forces placed tanks at intervals along the route near where the previous battle occurred in advance of the next convoy run. Almost on cue, the second convoy was engaged by the enemy taking out one of the supply trucks. The nearest tank immediately moved to clear the wreckage and prevent the rest of the convoy being held up, but this response had been anticipated by the enemy and the tank was disabled by mines placed off the road. During this battle I was tasked by the ground commander to engage a suspected enemy position in a ditch about 50 metres north of the action. I made several passes firing HE rockets, and although I didn’t see any result at the time, a subsequent sweep of the area by ground troops found five enemy bodies manning a machine gun.
The third event did not involve combat but was just as memorable, even though I was unable to witness it myself because I happened to be hospitalised at Vung Tau at the time. There was great excitement and anticipation among all US personnel at Lai Khe when it was announced in late November that the Bob Hope show was coming to town, and Raquel Welch was part of the troupe. In the event, the girls used the FAC hooch as their base for the show, because it had a hot shower and flushing toilet – all courtesy of Air Force ingenuity on an Army base. The hot water system was a kerosene fire under two salvaged droptanks off an F-100 that were raised to provide a head of pressure. The flushing toilet was a genuine Twyford vitreous china bowl, complete with seat and lid, as well as a door that could be closed for privacy.
I think it is unlikely that FACs will be used again in an entirely similar way in the RAAF. The availability of shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles these days is a significant deterrent against the use of FACs in the way they operated in Vietnam.