Delta Mission

submitted by: Alva Leon Matheson




On 24 April 1972, First Lieutenant Donald Schmidt and I were both flying near Kien Tuong Province south and west of Saigon. Most of this area had been overrun early in the NVA’s spring offensive, but some isolated outposts remained, manned by Special Forces advisors and irregulars. We FACs normally split the Delta into two areas and had two OV-10s airborne over them most of the time. Don and I were the last missions of the day, and although both of us had requested fighters for different targets, the weather was delta sierra and darkness was approaching.
We both received calls from Sundog X-Ray at Tan Son Nhut that our fighters had been cancelled due to the weather. We were given permission to RTB for the same reason. We had been headed towards Tan Son Nhut about five minutes when I received a call from “Armada 35,” the commander of the 216th Regional Force Company, stating that his unit was under heavy attack from two sides and that he needed air support. We knew that with the cloud ceiling, estimated at 2,000 feet AGL, and in darkness, we wouldn’t be getting any fighter support. I called Sundog X-Ray, explained the situation, and received permission to self-expend to defend the outpost. I thought it would be safer if Don and I joined up instead of groping our separate ways to the outpost. Don joined on me and we received continuous sitreps on our way back.
By the time we arrived at the outpost the ceiling was down to 1,500 feet AGL, rain showers dotted the area, and darkness was nearly complete. The only thing clearly visible from the air was the lighter shade of the dirt embankments that formed the three sides of the triangular shaped outpost. However, we could easily see the ground fire being directed toward the outpost. Light machine guns, B-40 rockets, 60 mm mortars and heavy machine guns, along with AK-47 fire, were hitting the friendlies.
Don and I formed a plan of attack. We set up a pattern around the outpost, each staying on opposite sides of the circle. I took the lead and kept my position lights on until shortly before I would roll in. By that means, Don was able to keep spacing on me for his attacks. A mid-air was the last thing we needed that night. As I made my first hot pass, I saw, and Don reinforced the fact, that light and heavy machine guns and small arms were directed at me. Don spotted two .51 cal machine guns and we went after them first. The ceiling and visibility was deteriorating, but we decided we would press the attack until contact was broken or we expended all our ordnance. As I recall, our standard load for the Delta was 2,000 rounds of “tiny pistol,” 14 Willie Petes, seven HEs, and seven flechettes.
On my second pass Don was able to pinpoint one of the .51s, and he silenced it with rockets on his next pass. After three more passes the other .51 was out of action. However, the outpost and we were both still taking small arms and light automatic weapon fire. We were strafing, in my estimation, within 50 meters of the outpost. The Army later said that we were within 100 meters – I know we were closer than that.
By 1915 hours the ceiling was so low and visibility so bad that we had to break off our attacks, and we both had expended all our ordnance. We were getting dangerously low on fuel, and we were a long ways from Tan Son Nhut. Reluctantly we headed home.
I logged 5.3 hours on that flight, the longest single sortie I ever flew in the OV-10. As I turned off the active at Tan Son Nhut, my right engine flamed out. I know that Someone up there was keeping an eye on me, too.
In a letter dated 25 April 1972, addressed to the Province Senior Advisor Lieutenant Colonel Robert Sprengman, the District Senior Advisor, Major George R. Kleb, USA, wrote that our air support halted the progress of the attack and enabled the defenders to rally until they received some artillery support, and a Spooky gunship arrived on the scene. A copy of that letter follows. Major Kleb also sent me a copy, and enclosed an NVA flag that they found the next day. I cherish it as one of my prized possessions. It represents a mission that typifies the essence of being a FAC.

HEADQUARTERS
KIEN BINH DISTRICT
ADVISORY TEAM 85 KEIM TOUNG PROVINCE
APO 96215
25 April 1972
SUBJECT: Tactical Air Support
TO: Province Senior Advisor
Advisory Team 85
APO 96215
1. At approximately 1845 on 24 April 1972 LZ 5 at coordinates XS 001658 came under heavy ground attack from the North and from the East. The attack was supported by light machine guns, B-40 rockets, and 60 millimeter mortar fire. Available artillery was fired in support of the LZ. Defending in the LZ was the 216 Regional Force Company with 86 men present for duty. The artillery support was of limited effect due to a short supply of ammunition.
2. Help was requested from the two FACs flying in the area, Covey 290 and Covey 569. The FACs were unable to obtain any fighter bomber support because of approaching darkness, higher priority requirements elsewhere and weather conditions which made the visibility ceiling too low for fighter bombers to be employed.
3. In spite of the marginal visibility and low ceiling which increased their vulnerability to ground-fire, the two FACs volunteered to expend their on board rockets and machine guns to aid the defenders of the LZ. After receiving clearance to fire, the FACs expended their machine guns within 100 meters of the LZ on the North and East sides destroying the momentum of the ground assault. Observing that they were taking heavy fire from several machine guns in the trees along the canal to the North of the LZ, the FACs expended rockets on the machine gun positions, silencing two machine guns, 4. By 1915 the ceiling was down to 2,000 feet and the FACs were out of ammunition so they were forced to break station. However, their very timely support halted the progress of the attack and enabled the defenders to rally until further artillery support could be obtained and a Spooky gunship could arrive on station. This brave action by these two FACs was a significant factor in the 216 Regional Force Company being able to turn back yet another attempt to overrun their LZ.
5. Request that this excellent performance of duty be brought to the attention of the appropriate commander.
George R. Kleb
MAJ, EN
District Senior Advisor