Musings About the Early FACs

submitted by: Alva Leon Matheson




First, after reading books like SOG and DaNang Diary, I think we have to break FACs down into two categories. The 1964 to about mid 1969 Bird dog FACs and the OV-10 FACs from the introduction of those airplanes in 1968 and the operational concepts that went along with them until the end of the conflict. The O-2 guys seem to be the transition folk, but I suspect they were more like the O-1 drivers.
Those of you who were FACs in the Bird Dog era will find some of the following remarks repetitious, but those of you who were driving the OV-10 may not be aware of some of this. Because of my time frame as a FAC, my comments only apply to the O-1 Bird Dog. Hopefully, some of you OV-10 guys will take the story further. Also, Ken Semmler, your initial training and the “Oz” (Australian) concepts would be enlightening.
When I went through training at Hurlburt Field in January-February of 1967, our instructors were FACs who flew in Vietnam in 1964, ‘65, and a few in ‘66. Most in my class were not fighter pilots, and most of us were multi-engine reciprocating engine types. In my case, I had about 800 hrs in the Goony Bird (C-47), and about the same in (T-29) Convairs. I had been flying Special Air Missions for 5th Army for two years, but I have no idea why I was selected to be a FAC, other than I was breathing, and a rated pilot and chosen because someone had to fill a quota. I had been identified as a Jungle Jim asset in 1960, but got caught in the rated draw down, and spent four plus years in the Mace cruise missile program.
During my time at Hurlburt, airborne tactics and methods were taught and retaught. When not flying, we received training in aerial ordinance, small arms weapons, hand-to-hand combat, physical fitness, air-ground operations planning and logistics, and enemy methods and tactics.
We flew and trained (20 missions) out of that wonderful short dirt strip called Holley Field, in the scrub pines of the Eglin AFB reservation. At night we would return to Hurlburt and the luxury of a hot shower, little realizing that later we would barely remember the luxury of hot water. We were indoctrinated and trained until we really believed we were different, a true elite and unique group. As a result, we worked hard, drank hard, played hard, and developed an incredible esprit and sense of immortality (Which I found left rather rapidly when I saw the first tracers go past my cowling!).
I arrived at Tan Son Nhut Airport, Saigon on the afternoon of April 8, 1967. After the hassle of getting through the welcoming committee from MACV, we found we also had to process through Vietnamese customs and immigration. We were then sorted out and transported to transient quarters where some would spend the night, and those of us whose orders were for bases in the local area were put on buses for transport.
At Bien Hoa Air Base, at the end of the duty day I discovered that my orders to the 505th Tactical Control Group actually now meant the 504th. I got signed in, was assigned a cot in transient quarters, and was told to report to the 504th at 0800 hours the next morning.
The next morning I started my in-processing. Processing ended with an interview with the ADO. He informed me that not having operational fighter experience disqualified me from serving as a category ‘A’ FAC, but my records had a “Jungle Jim” tag, and as I had come out of Tactical Air Command from a Special Air Missions squadron, I would be assigned as a FAC involved with special operations. (I suspect this convoluted thought process was known as command rationale). He wasn’t sure whether he would send me to II Corps or out to the 23rd TASS at Naked Fanny, (Where?) but he would make that determination after he had a chance to check the manning levels.
Upon arrival in Vietnam, all of us were sent to what we called “FAC U,” at Binh Thuy AB, down in lovely IV Corps in the heart of the delta country of the Mekong River. Here we received the required in-country familiarization briefings and our initial combat qualification checkout in the Bird Dog (36 landings plus weapons loading). After three flights, we were certified combat qualified, and all of us new tigers headed to our assigned hunting grounds.
Two dual rides at my assigned detachment, and I was cleared solo.
It was no surprise to any of us, that once we were in country we were classified as unconventional warfare specialists, the best of the best. With one exception, I never met a Bird Dog FAC who wasn’t convinced he was invincible, and had the best damn flying job in SEA. I unfortunately knew one Major ALO/FAC who was so afraid of combat he wouldn’t fly below 2,000 feet AGL.
Many of us started with a similar background to the above, and for the most part, the vast majority of us became good FACs and some even outstanding FACs. What characteristics did we have to develop to reach that point. I’ve mused about that, and come up with the following. I have not arranged these qualities in any order but I offer three for consideration, and invite anyone else to jump in and expand the list.
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: How else can we explain the ability of one pilot, tooling around the friendly skies of SEA, to listen to three radios, look out an open window, mentally evaluate rapidly changing situations, be able to locate himself relative to the map and friendly forces, think in terms of weaponry, airborne tactics, and the tactical situation, and still be able to sound cool and collected to troops on the ground?
FLYING ABILITY: We may not have been great pilots when we started, but within an incredibly short time, most of us came to love and trust the Bird Dog. You didn’t have to be a great pilot to fly her, and she was generally a forgiving aircraft. After just a few months it was possible to fly with the stick between the knees while looking through binoculars out a window. We learned to “move it around” and did things the Cessna engineers probably never envisioned.
PROTECTIVE: I believe most FACs were protective of their troops on the ground. It had little to do with tactics or conditions, but these folks, regardless of who they might be, were “His” and he was going to do everything possible to protect and help them. Perhaps something like a mother hen protecting her chicks.
As I said, these are at best, musings.
Gene Mc Cutchen, aka Red Marker (see “Among the First Ten PCS FACs” in 19th TASS Section) added:
Dick: I know I am going to be verbose but if you will allow me I promise when you are 83 I will reciprocate.
It’s not a short story and certainly not one I can lay down here in a few sentences. Remember we AF types bull nosed our way into a war in Indochina that reportedly did not need AF participation. Our mind set then was, priority one, air superiority leading to air supremacy of the battlefield (now battle space); priority two, tactical and strategic targeting to hurt the enemy’s ability to fight. The Army was expected to fight its own ground battles and the AF was to use its remaining assets to assist the Army after achieving the above.
The lack of proper joint staffing of the Vietnam conflict in the beginning, and perhaps the lack of our high level planners to recognize and know how to fight a Vietnam style war skewed our thinking. But when the AF decided to bull dog its way into the Vietnam situation, who did they have to conduct AF business? Its fighter pilots were experienced in Close Air Support missions with the Army, most had done FAC duty with Army units and had been through Air-Ground Operations School and the various joint schools. Most had dropped live ordnance and were familiar with most munitions. So I went from being an F-100 Squadron commander to being the ALO with the Vietnamese Airborne Regiment, later Division, in 1962 with no indoctrination or training other than the admonishment, “The Air Force is your only boss, don’t forget it,” and “Show them how to use air power.” Of course the question is, how many of you would have wanted to go straight from your peacetime job to FACing with no training? So the AF used its best-trained personnel for the early FAC assignments.
The duration of the Vietnam War caused us to use personnel resources far above what was anticipated. Probably some who were not suited to a combat role slipped through the cracks. In fact most AFers served in Vietnam at least once and many two or three times. But those that came later had the indoctrination and training to qualify them for the job. And most did an admirable job. I had only one FAC that quit. And I thanked him because I knew he would fail some unit in trouble in the future.
I would like to feel I had a tough and dangerous job and I did. But I didn’t know about FACing during the 1970s until recently. And I have to admit that I believe the “pucker factor” grew and climaxed with the 1970s guys.
So Dick we were talking about guys ready, willing and able to go in 1962 and guys that came later when there was time to train and prepare them. And now in answer to your question: What characteristics do we FACs have. I fall back to WWII for an example, my first how goes-it- report, (I don’t remember what it was called then, but later it was an OER or Officer Effectiveness Report) had one or two lines of written comment. Something like, “This officer meets all the standards of performance.” I was graded excellent because every officer was expected to be excellent, or not be an officer. So this WWII criteria was, in general, not too far wrong. To become an AF pilot places you in a special category, which translates to your being capable of doing many things with competence, dedication and esprit. But the bottom line is that 99.99% did their jobs with distinction, regardless of their different backgrounds and deserve the salute of a Warrior Brother.

“Just a brief note to tell you that Dick passed away on November 14th 2003 of cancer.”
Sincerely, Joyce Coyner