An A Shau Air Force Cross
submitted by: Alva Leon Matheson
On 21 May 1968, I was a 27 year old USAF Captain, Forward Air Controller (FAC) assigned to the 23rd Tactical Air Support Squadron, 23rd TASS, whose home was Nakhon Phanom Air Base, NKP, Thailand. My call sign was Nail 48 (all of the 23rd TASS pilots had Nail call signs). We flew the O-2 which was a military version of the Cessna 337, a light twin with a push-pull engine configuration. I had been in Southeast Asia since early August of 1967 first flying the O-1 Bird Dog, a single engine tail dragger Cessna, and then transitioned to the O-2 in November. I spent September, October, and part of November flying as a Raven FAC inside of Laos.
In early May 1968, the 23rd sent a detachment of FACs, to Ubon RTAFB Thailand to replace a detachment from the 20th TASS out of DaNang South Vietnam, SVN, the Coveys. Major Jerry Dwyer was the detachment commander. Prior to this time, the 23rd’s patrol area was Laos North of Route 9 while the Coveys had Laos South of Route 9. Route 9 was an old French road that ran east and west across Laos entering Vietnam at Khe Sanh. Route 911 was the main supply route from North Vietnam into South Vietnam running from Mu Gia Pass south into southern Laos where it had a myriad of branches into SVN. Tchepone, at the intersection of those routes had once been a village with a French airfield. Tchepone was an overlap area, the southern part of the northern patrol area and the northern part of the southern area.
We flew both day and night. Most of the action happened at night when The North Vietnamese (NVA), trucks would try to run the roads and we would try to stop them. During the day, we tried to find where the trucks had stopped and hidden and would make some attacks against the roads. Occasionally, we would have a good strike in the daytime but most of our damage was done at night. At night, of course, all the NVA antiaircraft gunners were awake and shooting. They knew it was more difficult for us to attack them at night, therefore unless we were actually putting in an airstrike, it was uncommon for us to be shot at in the daytime.
We had an unwritten rule that if a FAC got shot at in the daytime, we would put fighters on the guns. In the daytime, we flew about 3,000 feet above the ground to minimize the effectiveness of the guns. The primary NVA A A A in our area at that time were machine guns, ZPUs, with an effective range of about 1,500 feet, and the 37 mm with an effective range of about 5,000 feet. The 37 mm fired clips of seven shells that came up relatively slowly. If we saw it in time, we could dodge it. But, dodging one gun might expose us to five or six others. The 23 mm which was new at that time came up too fast to dodge and in a Gattling gun-like stream of shells with a range of over 5,000 feet. Radar controlled 57 mm guns ran us out of Mu Gia Pass but were not yet seen elsewhere in Laos.
When a pilot bailed out, all the rules for safe altitudes were forgotten.
I had been at Ubon for about two weeks and patrolling the northern part of southern Laos flying just south of Tchepone in the early afternoon when I heard the call on guard, the emergency frequency.
“Nail 55, I’ve been hit and am bailing out.” Nail 55 was Jerry Dwyer.
I pressed my mike button, “55, 48 here, where are you, I am on my way.”
He gave me a rough location about 25 miles to the south and then he was gone. I made the decision to give up my altitude for more airspeed and timed my descent to arrive at Jerry’s location at about 500 feet AGL and for the rest of the afternoon my altitude ranged from 50 to 500 feet AGL.
In the 8-10 minutes it took me to get down there, I was on the radio requesting fighters from the C-130 that was the Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC). I was told that nothing was available but that they would get some ASAP. I was also on the radio to Crown, the C- 130 that was the rescue airborne command post.
Our location was at maximum range for the HH-3s, Jolly Greens out of either NKP or DaNang who were on alert with A-1s for support. However, there was a HH-53, Super Jolly, at Ubon that did not have A-1 support. The HH-53 had never participated in a SEA rescue at that time. They was launched along with A-1s from NKP for support but it would be over an hour before the HH-53 could get there.
Because I had been a Raven FAC (a FAC stationed in Laos flying in civilian clothes working with Air American and the Laotian Air Force), I knew all the Air America frequencies. I went around Crown and rounded up an Air American H-34 and a Huey that could beat the USAF there and arranged for them to meet me. An Air America Porter also showed up.
Jerry had landed at the bottom of a hill in fairly heavy jungle. The hill had a clear area about the size of a football field extending from the jungle at the bottom to a grassy area at top. The field had trees on each side extending up from the jungle. There was another hill on the other side of the jungle area which was more heavily forested but had some clear area at the top which was higher than Jerry’s hill. As I arrived and was able to talk to Jerry on his survival radio, he could hear searchers in the jungle with him. The clear area had an erosion ditch in the middle that ran from about 2/3 of the way from the jungle toward the top. Somehow, Jerry got into the ditch and crawled up it out of the jungle to where it ended. There he put his West Point Army training to work and scraped himself into a fox hole and we fought a war for him and over him for the rest of the afternoon.
I arrived, got a rough verbal description of his location, brought in the Air America helicopters and provided cover with my rockets while they made two tries to pick him up after Jerry popped a smoke for a positive position.
From then on the bad guys knew exactly where he was. Neither helicopter had a hoist. The H-34 landed in the clear area at the top of the hill and came under small arms fire which I suppressed. Jerry reported afterwards that he saw the bodies of NVA that I had hit during my multiple passes. He would not, however, leave his hole to try to run the thirty yards or so to the helicopter and the Air America choppers had to pull out because the enemy was getting a machine gun set up on the next hill that would have made them sitting ducks.
Of course all this time I was yelling for fighters! One of my friends who had flown B-52s with me at Minot, Ben Fuhrman, was flying F-105s on a mission to South Vietnam and heard me when I first requested ordinance while I was on my way down there. He requested and was refused permission to divert to me. But, two other F-105s arrived just in the nick of time and I hit the ZPU on the hill with them, just as it was starting to fire at Jerry and me.
Just after I hit the ZPU, the H-53 arrived screaming that he was out of gas and had to make an immediate pickup. The normal procedure was no pickups without A-1s but I knew that I just CBUd the area, that the Air America helicopters had survived, and that we had the F-105s deliver with no hits to them, so, I told him to go on in.
Jerry popped another flare and the Super Jolly went in but missed his hover (he had gone to the wrong location). He pulled out and then came back and hovered again for what seemed like an eternity. He took some hits, (one of the crew chiefs or PJs was slightly wounded) and he was forced to pull out. I commended his bravery but his skill was lacking! Crown came down from his orbit and refueled him which was the first combat helicopter refueling...ever!!!
As that was happening, the first A-1s, three of them, arrived from NKP and we constantly delivered ordinance along the two tree lines and the jungle from then on.
Eventually, I had 13 A-1s in a pattern that revolved around me (I was flying lower and tighter in the middle...like the ringmaster in a three ring circus). Normally, the senior A-1 pilot (Sandy Lead) was designated as the on-scene rescue commander. I think Crown designated me as the on-scene commander since I had the rescue going before the A-1s arrived.
Designated or undesignated, I was the commander! The leader of the last flight of A-1s to arrive wanted to discuss why I was the on-scene commander and was told by the Sandy Lead to shut up and get in the pattern!
The bad guys tried to follow Jerry up the ditch. One crawled up outside the ditch and tossed a grenade in Jerry’s hole! It failed to go off. Jerry tossed it out, looked over the side of his hole and saw the tosser lying there with his hand over his ears waiting for the grenade to go off.
Jerry shot him with his .38!
I carried 14 rockets and had used seven or eight with the Air America helicopters and marking the ZPU for the F-105s. I used the others hitting the guys coming up the ditch firing within 20-25 yards of Jerry without any sights for my rockets. In essence, I got so close that I could not miss!
After I ran out of rockets the Sandy Lead A-1 pilot took over my job. While this was going on, the NVA were attempting to capture Jerry. Two made it close enough for Jerry to hit with his pistol! I saw several grenades go off near his hole!
This went on for almost two hours after the H-53 missed the pickup. After the HH-53 had missed the pickup, the HH-3s from DaNang had been scrambled. They were about 20 minutes out when they called and said they did not have enough gas to get there and back and Crown told them to abort the rescue and return to DaNang.
At that time it was less than an hour till dark when we could not have continued the SAR. I did not want to leave Jerry so it was critical that we get the pick up completed ASAP. In addition to the A-1s, after the first F-105s, I always had at least two flights of fighters holding high over head. My plan was that if there was no pick up by dark I would ask Jerry to move back deep into the jungle, and then I would use the fighters to pound the area where he had been to discourage NVA pursuit!
When Crown told the Jollys to abort, I did what others would not have the knowledge to do. I got on the radio directly to the HH-3s, usurped command from Crown, and promised them that if they would come on I would guarantee that the would get gas at a safe location in Laos. I knew from my Raven days that about 20 miles away there was an Air America STOL strip that had gas. Crown was prohibited from authorizing rescue Helos to land in Laos, so I had to take matters into my own hands. The HH-3s listened to me and kept coming. The Air America Porter had remained in orbit about 10 miles away just in case I needed him. I told him to set up the gas at the Lima Site and to expect us for refueling after the pickup.
When the HH-3s came in, Jerry was out of flares. I directed them toward our location and then flew under them directly over Jerry’s position to show them where he was I pulled up and they pulled out almost immediately and my heart sank into my shoes...and I thought “what am I going to have to do now, they too have pulled out!!”
But, after hovering only a matter of seconds, they had picked him up!! It was about 20 minutes till dark. I was out of gas too! I could make the STOL strip in Laos but not much father! Ubon, an hour away, was impossible!
I did not even have the gas to direct the fighters which clobbered the whole area as we pulled out. I just told them to hit it and headed for the STOL Strip.
I got back on the radio to Air America and found out that since they did not think we could make the STOL strip before dark and there were no lights there, they had set up the landing at the airfield outside the largest town in that part of Laos which was about 35 miles away, where they had lights.
The Jolly Greens and the Nail landed and were gassed up while the A-1s orbited overhead attracting unwanted attention (I fully expected to be court-martialed for exposing what everyone in that part of the world knew, and what the politicians would not tell the US public; that the USA was fighting a war in Laos).
After a great reunion with Jerry, he climbed into my O-2 with me (with several beers supplied by the Air America troops!) and we flew back to Ubon in a very good mood!!
No, I did not drink any of the beer! The champagne at Ubon was a different story.
The next day I was told to return to NKP. When I got there, I was told that I was grounded from combat because I had been submitted for the Medal of Honor and that Jerry was being submitted for the Air Force Cross.
Jerry had bailed out before in non-hostile but not necessarily friendly territory and was picked up with out any excitement. This was his second shoot down. Supposedly, there was a policy (the two shoot down rule) that said that if you were rescued twice you got to go home...and he wanted to go home! The Air Force wanted him to go to 7th AF Hq. He was not amused!
Then the politics got messy. About three weeks later, the 504th Commander came to NKP. He and the 23rd Commander, Lt Col Starr, conferred with the Task Force Alpha Major General and then I met Lt Colonel Starr. He told me that I would receive the Air Force Cross because I had not been wounded, my aircraft had not been hit, and also because the whole story could not be told due to the classification of our operations in Laos.
He also said that Jerry would receive the Silver Star.
If I had been on the ground and Jerry or any of the other Nail FACs had been in my place, I would have expected them to direct the air strikes and take the risks of being hit and do exactly what I did. They would have done their best in that regard and most of them would have done as well as I did. But, at that time, no other Nail FAC, had the knowledge of Air America activities that I had picked up as a RAVEN FAC in Laos. Thus it is unlikely that they would have been able to attempt the pickup with Air America resources.
I’d like to think that if I had been on the ground, I would have attempted the run to the Air America helicopter, made it, and that everything else would have been unnecessary. But...I was not on the ground...Jerry was!
If someone else had had the knowledge of the STOL site, they might or might not have taken the career risk of usurping command of the rescue from Crown and persuading the HH-3s to keep coming when their command post was telling them to turn around. If it worked I was a hero, if not, I was a goner. But, it never entered my mind that I was making a career threatening decision, I was just trying to get Jerry out!
I hesitate to be so honest, but I did not expect to make it back if the rescue had not been successful. (Nor could I have...I was out of gas...and I was NOT going to leave my fellow Airman!!) I had told Jerry I would get him out or be down there with him and I fully meant it!
Afterward
The Medal of Honor submittal said nothing about the Air America pickup attempt, and I am certain that it said nothing about my continuing the SAR after Crown called off the rescue. It also said nothing about the mutual landings in Laos. I doubt that even today the USAF could officially admit everything that happened that afternoon.
I am very proud to wear the Air Force Cross. When I was awarded it at Bitburg AB Germany in November of 1968, Colonel Bernie Fisher, the first Medal of Honor winner in Vietnam, was stationed there and was at the ceremony. He shook my hand and said,
“Phil, you deserved the Medal of Honor”.
I really appreciate that people feel that way, especially when they really believe it, but you will never hear me say it, because...it was all in a day’s work...for a Nail FAC!
Citation: Air Force Cross
CAPTAIN PHILLIP V. MAYWALD for extraordinary heroism in military operations against an opposing armed force as an O-2A pilot in Southeast Asia on 21 May 1968. On that date, Captain Maywald braved an intense and deadly barrage of hostile gunfire for over two hours while he controlled the successful rescue of a fellow pilot who had been downed by antiaircraft fire deep within hostile territory. Despite the great personal risk involved to his own life, Captain Maywald, with undaunted determination, indomitable courage, and professional skill, repeatedly made low passes over the rescue scene in his light unarmored observation aircraft. At times, he flew within fifty feet of the hostile forces to determine their positions and to deliberately draw their fire on his aircraft. Due to his courage, persistance, and professional skill the downed pilot was safely recovered. Through his extraordinary heroism, superb airmanship, and aggressiveness, Captain Maywald reflected the highest credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.