THE MOSQUITOS OF THE KOREAN WAR
submitted by: Alva Leon Matheson
The Mosquitos were born when U.S. and South Korean army units retreated before an enemy vastly superior in numbers and armament. They began as a small Air Force squadron, but they grew into a multi-service and multi-national group as men from the U.S. Army and United Nations armies worldwide joined their ranks to fly as observers in the T-6s. The organization was infused throughout with an unsurpassed esprit de corps and camaraderie as men fulfilled their often hazardous and always critical duties. The Mosquitos were disbanded as an Air Force organization after the war, but the spirit lives on in a veterans organization of the same name.
The days immediately after the outbreak of the war saw the South Korean army in full retreat before a well-armed and seemingly invincible North Korean invader. The United Nations condemned the unexpected North Korean aggression and called for member nations to aid South Korea. The United States responded and committed U.S. units from Japan as they became available, slowing but not stopping the initial North Korean advance. As the UN forces formed into a perimeter around the southeastern port city of Pusan, the North Koreans prepared to eliminate the last pocket of resistance.
Prophets of doom received a credible hearing with their predictions that a full scale military and political disaster was at hand: a Communist aggressor would push the U.S. Army into the sea and swallow South Korea whole. This disaster scenario did not play out, due largely to the success of air power with interdiction and close air support. In the latter case the Mosquitos performed the critical mission of target location and air strike control.
When the Korean War began, military doctrine regarded close air support as an important element in the firepower available to ground forces. Units in contact with the enemy could call on fighter-bombers to neutralize enemy strong points, destroy vehicles and eliminate troop concentrations. However to assure effective use of ordnance and prevent accidental striking of friendly forces, a controller had to be in sight of the target area, in radio contact with the fighter-bombers and had to continuously monitor and direct this firepower. This responsibility was assigned to an Air Force unit call a Tactical Air Control Party.
A TACP consisted of a pilot who was given the title of Forward Air Controller, an airman radio operator and an airman radio mechanic. Their equipment consisted of a jeep, which had radio equipment compatible with the radios in the fighter-bombers. Eight TACPs were available in Japan at the outbreak of the war. These were deployed rapidly in support of South Korean ground units, thus giving them the distinction of being the first U.S. and UN combat units to enter the war.
In theory a TACP seemed an ideal arrangement: an Air Force team on the ground directing air strikes by fighter-bombers. However, the Korean battle situation soon revealed serious flaws. Since the FAC had to be able to see the target area to control the strike many targets were not engaged because the primitive Korean roads made rapid movement between sectors of the front impossible. When roads existed at all they rarely reached good observation points. TACPs that persevered and gained good observation position frequently became targets themselves because their radio jeep could be seen by the enemy. Remote control equipment which would have allowed the TACP to conceal their radio jeep a safer distance away from their observation point was not available until later in the war.
Further, some TACPs, moving between sectors were ambushed or cutoff by the rapidly moving enemy and were forced to destroy their equipment and regain friendly lines on foot. Some were killed, reported missing or taken prisoner. The need to augment the existing system was apparent and so was the solution: a controller who would move rapidly over the battlefield, an airborne controller. The 5th Air Force began looking for aircraft and methods to implement this approach.
The first attempts to provide an airborne controller were through the use of L-5s and other liaison-type aircraft. These aircraft were found to be unsuitable because of their vulnerability to air attack and their inadequate radio equipment. The faster, more rugged and more available T-6 was tried and scored an immediate success. Then just a few weeks after the outbreak of the war, 5th AF scraped together aircraft, pilots and support personnel from its own meager resources and formed a provisional air control squadron, giving it the designation of 6147th Tactical Control Squadron (Airborne).
The T-6s of the 6147th were in place continuously in their assigned areas for up to three hours a flight always searching for and locating targets on reverse slopes of hill masses and beyond the view of friendly troops. During a strike they were able to see all of the target area and correct the aim of the fighter-bombers. They were able to move easily between sectors of the front and were ready to respond to a radio call from a TACP. They gained an additional pair of trained eyes and a ground soldier’s perspective when officers and noncoms from infantry and artil- lery units came aboard to fly in the back seat as observers.
The Air Force gave the T-6s the descriptive prefix of “Mosquito” to their radio call signs, an appropriate name which caught on and was soon applied officially to the infant squadron and the airborne controllers.
Success brought more aircraft, men and the expansion from a squadron into the 6147th Tactical Control Group. The group reached its peak when it grew to include the 6148th and 6149th Tactical Control Squadrons, the 6147th Air Base Squadron, the 6147th Maintenance and Supply Squadron and the 6147th Medical Squadron. The TACPs which had been assigned to various other Air Force units came aboard as the 6150th TCS. FACs, formerly drawn from the ranks of fighter-bomber pilots, were then drawn from the ranks of Mosquito pilots who had completed the first 20 of their 100 Mosquito missions.
Continuous improvements were made in equipment. The older T-6s were replaced by T-6Gs. Target marking ability was added with 12 smoke rockets suspended under the wings. Radio equipment was upgraded to provide 12 VHF channels. An SCR-300, the Army “Walkie-Talkie,” was put on board to enable the Mosquitos to contact ground units directly. Thus, the fighting machine of the Korean War most respected for its effectiveness by both friend and enemy very likely was an unarmed trainer aircraft!
The TACP radio jeeps were upgraded to the new VRC-3s. The VHF radio installation on the jeeps was then almost identical to that on the aircraft. The Mosquitos in the air and the TACPs on the ground made an efficient team. The TACPs could now co-locate with regimental and division command posts and relay information on possible targets for the Mosquito to investigate. They could relay information from the Mosquito reconnaissance to battlefield commanders, who came to depend on and trust this intelligence. When necessary the TACPs would move forward to back-up or direct both day and night-time air strikes as well as battlefield illumination by C-47s dropping parachute flares.
The TACPs were called on for still another duty when the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team made parachute assaults in 1950 and 1951 to trap the retreating enemy. A TACP consisting of a FAC and a radio operator jumped with each battalion of the 187th. Their combat load contained two-channel battery powered radios. They became a fully equipped team when the radio mechanic joined them with a radio jeep. He reached them by driving the jeep with the infantry, pushing north to linkup with the airborne forces.
The decisions required to match available fighter-bombers with targets were made on the ground in the Tactical Air Control Center. The TACC frequently needed to communicate directly with the Mosquitos over the front lines but could not do so because of the range limitations of the radios. This problem was solved initially by equipping a T-6 as a passive radio relay and stationing it between front lines and the TACC. Later, this idea was expanded when C-47 aircraft were equipped with multiple radio installations, each manned by an operator. It used the
same radio call sign of the TACC but with the prefix “Mosquito.” An officer was aboard who could make decisions about allocation of close air support if an emergency or unusual target opportunity arose. With direct contact to all Mosquitos over the front lines and frequently with TACPs this aircraft and its men became an effective command and control center.
The Mosquitos made many base relocations as the front lines moved up and down the Korean Peninsula, but always stayed with a short flying distance of the front lines to maximize air time over their assigned areas. They even reached the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and had an advance party on the Yalu River in preparation to set up operations there. The Chinese intervention into the war, however, caused this advanced outpost to be lost.
A retreating enemy left nothing of value at the airfields he vacated. Thus crude living quarters and non-existent maintenance facilities marked life at the Mosquito bases. Hangers and shops had to be improvised. Tents were used for hangars when possible. When not, the open air sufficed. A common sight was ground crews changing an engine on a T-6 parked in a frozen field. Frostbite, fatigue and occasional harassing gunfire from guerrilla forces were the lot of the support people.
The success of the Mosquitos came with a cost in casualties. Fifty men were killed in action. Sixteen were reported missing in action and are presumed dead. Thirty-one became prisoners of war, 12 of which died or were killed in prison. Approximately one-third of the Mosquito casualties were TACP members. Most of these occurred immediately after the Chinese intervention and during the battles of the Chosin Reservoir and the Chongchon River. In a single day in one corps area, five of the seven T-6s which entered the area were struck by enemy fire. One T-6 was hit and repaired so many times it was given the name of “Patches.”
As a squadron and as a group, the Mosquitos received three U.S. Distinguished Unit Citations and two Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citations. The 6147th TCG no longer exists, but the Mosquito spirit is very much alive. The veterans of this organization have kept their wartime name fresh by forming The Mosquito Association. Any man who served with the 6147th TCG or related organization is eligible for membership.
The most recent recognition of the Mosquitos came with the unveiling of the Korean War Memorial in Washington, D.C. The centerpiece of the memorial, located across the reflective pool from the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, is a patrol of foot soldiers moving through an open field. In focus is an Air Force Forward Air Controller.